Institutionalizing the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention\u27s Independence by Rubinstein Reiss, Dorit
107 
INSTITUTIONALIZING THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION’S INDEPENDENCE 
Dorit Rubinstein Reiss1 
Abstract 
The United States’ response to the COVID-19 pandemic was sub-
optimal. One problem in it was the politicization of the public health 
response. One aspect of that politicization was aggressive political 
intervention in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
efforts to provide guidance and help pandemic response. The concern was 
strong enough that four previous CDC Directors, in an unusual step, 
published an op-ed calling out political intervention in the CDC. This 
article proposes two changes to strengthen the CDC’s institutional 
independence: codifying the CDC’s role in preventing diseases and 
reducing harms in a statute, and restructuring the agency to be led by a 
multi-member board appointed for long times and with removal 
protections (along the lines of the Board of the Federal Reserve System). 
These changes can send a strong message that expert advice in public 
health should be science-based and less, rather than more, political. It 
can also protect CDC’s long-standing independence, while preserving 
some political control. 
Experts generally regard the United States’ response to the COVID-
19 pandemic as unsatisfactory.2 One aspect of the problem–though by no 
1. LLB, Ph.D.; Professor of Law, James Edgar Hervey Chair in Litigation, University of
California, Hastings College of Law.  I would like to gratefully acknowledge the enormously helpful  
feedback on earlier versions of this manuscript provided by Arthur Caplan, Liz Ditz, Bill Foege, Alan 
Hinman, Jeff Koplan, Paul Offit, and Walter Orenstein (I am not implying any off these people agree 
with my suggestions). A special debt of gratitude is owed Lindsay Wiley for her detailed input into 
the article. Finally, I would like to thank Viridiana Ortez and Raena Waldman for excellent research 
work. All errors are, of course, my own.  
2. John Kirlin, COVID-19 Upends Pandemic Plans, AM. REV. PUB. HEALTH, July 16,
2020,https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0275074020941668; Rebecca L. Haffajee & 
Michelle M. Mello, Thinking Globally, Acting Locally–the U.S. Response to COVID-19, 382 NEW 
ENG. J. MEDICINE e75 (2020); Nancy J. Knauer, The COVID-19 Pandemic and Federalism: Who 
Decides?, 23 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y (July 27, 2020), 
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means all of it–was the strong politicization of the response, including 
politicization of federal public health guidelines. 3 Apparent political 
influence on guidance offered by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) has undermined the agency’s ability to provide data 
and recommendations that government leaders, private organizations, and 
the general public can trust to guide their actions. In a glaring example, 
after President Trump criticized previous CDC guidelines on the topic, the 
CDC released a document on schools reopening that experts say 
understated the risk of opening schools, clearly influenced by the White 
House. 4 Even more concerning, the Trump Administration’s intervened – 
or at least attempted to intervene–in the CDC’s journal, the Morbidity and 
Mortality Weekly Report, traditionally a source of objective scientific 
information. 5 The Trump administration has also acted to reduce the 
CDC’s ability to collect coronavirus data; this raises real concerns about 
the ability of the CDC to perform its role of providing expert guidance 
and helping to contain the pandemic. 6  This situation creates concerns that 
the White House will try to interfere in CDC’s traditional role in 
recommending vaccines, or marginalize its committees in the process of 
overseeing COVID-19 vaccines in development.  
The intensity of the COVID-19 crisis justifies reconsidering the 
governance of the CDC. I recommend that Congress act in two ways to 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3599239; H. Daniel Xu & Rashima Basu, How 
the United States Flunked the COVID-19 Test: Some Observations and Several Lessons, AM. REV. 
PUB. ADMIN. (July 15, 2020), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0275074020941701. 
3. David P. Carter & Peter J. May, Making Sense of the U.S. COVID-19 Pandemic Response:
A Policy Regime Perspective, 42 ADMIN. THEORY & PRAXIS 265, 266 (2020). 
4. Barbara Sprunt & Cory Turner, White House Stumbles Over How Best to Reopen Schools,
as Trump Blasts CDC Guidance, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 8, 2020), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/07/08/888898194/trump-blasts-expensive-cdc-guidelines-for-reopening-
schools; Laura Meckler & Rachel Weiner, CDC Director Concedes Schools in “Hot Spots” Face 
Tougher Call on Reopening, WASH. POST, July 24, 2020; Caitlin McCabe & Leslie Brody, CDC 
Issues Coronavirus Guidelines for Reopening Schools, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/
articles/cdc-issues-coronavirus-guidelines-for-reopening-schools-11595612205 (last updated July 
24, 2020); Tom Frieden, Jeffrey Coplan, David Satcher & Richard Besser, We Ran the CDC. No 
President ever Politicized its Science the Way Trump Has, July 14, 2020, available at: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/07/14/cdc-directors-trump-politics/ 
5. Amy Maxmen, Why the United States is having a Coronavirus Data Crisis, NATURE, Aug.
25, 2020, available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02478-z; Dan Diamond, Trump 
Officials Interfered with CDC Reports on COVID-19, POLITICO, Sept. 11, 2020, available at: 
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/09/11/exclusive-trump-officials-interfered-with-cdc-reports-
on-covid-19-412809; Noah Weiland, Sharyl Gay Stolberg & Abby Goodnough, Political Appointees 
Meddled in C.D.C.’s “Holiest of the Holy” Health Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2020, available at, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/12/us/politics/trump-coronavirus-politics-cdc.html  
6. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Trump Administration Strips C.D.C. of Control of Coronavirus Data,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2020. 
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increase CDC’s ability to act independently to promote public health.  
First, Congress should codify CDC’s functions in a statute that clearly 
gives it the responsibility to provide guidance, training and support during 
outbreaks, and second, Congress should reorganize the CDC as an 
independent agency and replace its director–appointed and removable at 
the President’s discretion—with a board akin to Federal Reserve System’s 
Board of Governors. At this point, CDC does not have direct, specialized 
statutory authority for its primary roles, and the CDC director is appointed 
by the President with no oversight and removable at will. This leaves the 
CDC with little formal defenses against administration efforts to interfere 
in its efforts to reduce diseases and harms, and can both undermine trust 
(necessary for CDC guidance to have an impact) and directly undermine 
public health. 
The tension between politics and expertise is far from new. In public 
health policy, it is unavoidable. Public health policy is inherently political 
because it involves decisions about allocating resources and broad value 
judgments in which public health must be weighed against other policy 
concerns. Yet, public health policy determinations must be based on 
accurate and up-to-date data and evidence-based guidelines. Politicization 
of the data and public health recommendations that guide management of 
health threats undermines the effectiveness and accountability of the 
public health groups. 
The relationship between assuring political responsiveness and 
providing good expertise is complex, and a full discussion of it is beyond 
the scope of this article. 7 But one major concern in it is that politics may 
lead to distortion of scientific information; intervention in an agency 
whose main role is to advise, train, and provide information brings that 
concern to the forefront. 8 This makes a very strong case for limiting direct 
political intervention in the daily functioning (as opposed to the broader 
framework) of an agency whose main role is providing surveillance, 
expert advice and guidance. 
7. For several in-depth discussions, see Wendy E. Wagner, A Place of Agency Expertise:
Reconciling Agency Expertise with Presidential Power, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2019, 2026-31 (2015); 
Gillian Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of 
Powers, 59 EMORY L. J. 423, 430, 430 n.27 (2009); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics 
in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L. J. 2, 33-56 (2009); Thomas O. McGarity, Our 
Science Is Sound Science and Their Science Is Junk Science: Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding 
Accountability and Responsibility for Risk-Producing Products and Activities, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 
897, 921-31 (2004).  
8. Wagner, supra note 7, at 2022-23; McGarity, supra note 7, at 897-900.
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I. THE CDC’S ROLE GENERALLY 
There is not a primary authorizing statute that created the CDC or 
assigned it roles, unlike, for example, the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA). Specific statutes delegate specific duties to CDC, and the Public  
Health Service Act is regarded as creating authority for the federal 
government to act on infectious diseases generally, but the CDC was 
created by executive action, not statute.9 The Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention started as a war-time agency in 1942, as the Office of 
Malaria Control in War Areas. 10 It was established in Atlanta, GA because 
“the southeastern location represented the central point of endemic 
malaria in the United States at that time.”11 After the war ended, officials 
in the United States Public Health Service supported the creation of a 
permanent expert organization to assist states in disease control by 
providing science, training, and epidemiologic investigation. 12 The CDC, 
therefore, was designed from the start to provide expert knowledge and 
support in responding to infectious diseases threats. It was designed as 
“several centers that would make available to the state health departments 
certain highly specialized competencies which few states could afford to 
maintain on their own staffs. Each center would concentrate on a broad 
segment of public health.”13 The CDC’s scope has since expanded to 
cover a large variety of communicable and non-communicable disease 
threats, but its basic role has not changed. 14 
The CDC’s main role is developing knowledge and providing expert 
guidance and assistance to others–at the local, state, federal and 
international level. 15 This is reflected in the CDC’s description of its “core 
capabilities,” including “develop [ing] and deploy[ing] world-class data 
and analytics,” “maintain[ing] state-of-the-art laboratory capacity,” 
providing “elite public health expertise,” and “quickly respond[ing] to 
outbreaks at their source.” 16 
9. ELIZABETH W. ETHERIDGE, SENTINEL FOR HEALTH: A HISTORY OF THE CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL 16-17 (1st ed. 1992). 
10. William H. Foege, Centers for Disease Control, 2 J. PUB. HEALTH POL’Y 8, 8 (1981).
11. Id.  In a personal communication, Dr. Alan Hinman clarified that the Southern location was
“ also because there were many military training bases in the southeast.  Although the army could 
handle malaria on-base, there was need to control malaria around the bases.” (Comments on a 
previous draft, sent via email, August 19, 2020).   
12. Id. at 8-9.
13. Id. at 9.
14. ETHERIDGE, supra note 9, at 341-43.
15. Id.
16. CDC Strategic Framework, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/about/organization/strategic-framework/index.html (last visited July 8, 2010).  
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Congress has occasionally given the CDC specific authorities.17 The 
Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Surgeon General have 
also delegated the organization specific powers. Some of these powers are 
regulatory. It is through delegation, for example, that the CDC is in charge 
of issuing federal quarantine orders. 18 CDC initially had regulatory 
authority over clinical laboratories, but this authority has since been 
reassigned to the FDA, with the CDC continuing to be involved primarily 
in an advisory and support capacity. 19 The CDC also manages the 
Vaccines for Children program in a regulatory role, a federal program 
designed to provide vaccines at no cost to children who may have access 
barriers. 20 
Although it also has regulatory responsibilities, the bulk of the 
CDC’s work, as described above, is still as an expert body which collects, 
analyzes and disseminates data, provides support and advice to states and 
local bodies (and now, international bodies and other countries too21). 
This was its role in most of the major health problems in the United States, 
including the opioid crisis, lead paint, disease outbreaks, and now during 
the COVID-19 pandemic. 22 
17. E.g., Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness and Advancing Innovation Act
(PAHPAIA), Pub. L. No. 116-22, § 319(c)-(d) (3)(b) (2019) (giving the CDC consulting authority in 
regional health care emergency preparedness).   
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 264-265 provided the initial power to the Secretary of Health.  See Wendy E.
Parmet & Michael Sinha, COVID-19–The Law and the Limits of Quarantine, 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
(2020), https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2004211; James J. Misrahi, The CDC’s 
Communicable Disease Regulations, Striking the Balance Between Public Health and Individual 
Rights, 67 EMORY L. J. 463 (2018). 
19. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments (CLIA), U.S. FOOD & DRUGS ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/ 
medical-devices/ivd-regulatory-assistance/clinical-laboratory-improvement-amendments-clia 
(current as of Feb. 25, 2020).  
20. Jason Schwartz & James Colgrove, The Vaccines for Children Program at 25–Access,
Affordability, and Sustainability. 382 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2277 (2020). 
21. Joel M. Montgomery et al., Ten Years of Global Disease Detection and Counting: Program 
Accomplishments and Lessons Learned in Building Global Health Security, 19 BIOMED CENT. PUB. 
HEALTH 510 (2019), https://bmcpublichealth.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12889-019-6769-
2. 
22. For example, CDC provides guidance and advice on opioids and lead paint, and advised,
trained, and assisted in outbreak response in the United States and elsewhere. Joseph V. Pergolizzi,  
Melanie Rosenblatt & Jo Ann LeQuang, Three Years Down the Road: The Aftermath of the CDC 
Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain, 26 ADVANCES IN THERAPY 1235 (2019) 
(opioids); Adrienne S. Ettinger, Monica L. Leonard & Jacquelyn Mason, CDC’s Lead Poisoning 
Prevention Program: A Long-Standing Responsibility and Commitment to Protect Children from 
Lead Exposure, 25 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC. s5 (2019) (lead paint); Gabrielle O’Meara et. al., 
Ensuring a Competent Public Health Responder Workforce: The CDC Experience, 17 J. EMERGENCY 
MGMT. 199 (2019) (advice, training, and assistance).  See also ETHERIDGE, supra note 9, at 341-43 
(general summary and details).  
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II. THE CDC’S ROLE IN THE US RESPONSE TO THE CORONAVIRUS 
PANDEMIC, A SHORT PRIMER 
In January 2020, in response to reports of a pneumonia outbreak in 
Wuhan, China caused by a novel coronavirus strain, federal officials 
initiated containment measures to prevent the epidemic from reaching the 
US.  CDC instituted public health entry screening at major international 
airports in the US on January 17, 23 but there is no evidence that airport 
screening resulted in detection of any reported cases during the 
containment phase. 24 Two Americans who had recently returned from 
Wuhan tested positive for the novel coronavirus on January 21 and 24 
after arriving at hospitals with symptoms; they were treated in isolation 
rooms. 25  CDC reported these cases to the public, along with 
recommendations about measures state and local governments, clinicians, 
and the general public should take in response. 26 On January 29, the State 
Department repatriated hundreds of Americans from Wuhan.27 Under the 
first federal quarantine order issued in more than 50 years, 28 CDC ordered 
23. Public Health Screening to Begin at 3 U.S. Airports for 2019 Novel Coronavirus (“2019-
nCoV”), CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Jan. 17, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/p0117-coronavirus-screening.html; First Travel-Related 
Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus Detected in United States, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/p0121-novel-coronavirus-
travel-case.html (describing expansion of public health entry screening to additional airports); Lori 
Aratani & Miriam Berger, Here Are the 20 U.S. Airports Where Health Officials Are Screening for 
Coronavirus, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 2020 (CDC announcing expansion of public health entry 
screening to cover a total of 20 airports on January 28). 
24. Out of 256 individuals across 34 jurisdictions for whom CDC staff recommended testing
in January 2020—at a time when testing was available solely through CDC—six were identified 
through airport screening. CDC did not specify whether any of the six identified through airport  
screening were among the 11 who tested positive in January. See Kristina L. Bajema et al., Persons  
Evaluated for 2019 Novel Coronavirus—United States, January 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY 
WEEKLY REP. 166 (2020). 
25. First Travel-Related Case, supra note 23; Second Travel-Related Case of 2019 Novel
Coronavirus Detected in United States, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Jan. 24, 
2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/p0124-second-travel-coronavirus.html.  
26. First Travel-Related Case, supra note 23; Second Travel-Related Case, supra note 25.
27. HHS and CDC Receive Flight Carrying Repatriated US Citizens, CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/s0129-
repatriated-US-citizens.html#:~:text=This%20morning%2C%20the%20Department%
20of,Air%20Reserve%20Base%20in%20California.  
28. CDC is authorized to issue orders isolating individuals reasonably believed to be infect ed
or quarantining individuals reasonably believed to have been exposed to any of the diseases listed in 
a standing Executive Order. The list includes severe acute respiratory syndrome, which officials 
determined was sufficient to encompass infection with the novel coronavirus strain. Transcript for 
CDC Media Telebriefing: Update on 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), CENTERS FOR DISEASE  
CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Jan. 31, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/t0131-2019-
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the repatriated individuals to be held in government-provided facilities at 
March Air Reserve Base in California while being monitored for 
symptoms and tested for infection during a 14-day incubation period.29 
None tested positive. 30 On January 30, CDC reported the first instance of 
human-to-human transmission occurring within the US—between one of 
the first travel-acquired cases and a household contact.31 
As part of its role in pandemic response, the CDC had to create test 
kits. Possibly due to time pressure to get tests out, the CDC sent tests 
where one of the components was contaminated in a way that made the 
results invalid to “33 states and 70 labs in 66 countries.”32 As a 
consequence, data from these states was unreliable. 33 It took the CDC 
several days to identify the problem and remove the contaminated 
component, and after discovery of the problem in February, it took until 
March 15, 2020 to receive a revised Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) 
from the Food and Drug Administration for a test without the problematic 
component. 34 
By late February, the CDC realized that there were case of COVID-
19 in individuals who had not travelled to China/had contact with a 
traveler. 35 Reports from China, Germany, and elsewhere indicated that 
asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic individuals were capable of 
transmitting infection to others, rendering guidance focused on people 
novel-coronavirus.html (confirming that the last time a federal quarantine order—as distinct from an 
isolation order—was issued was in the 1960s for a smallpox evaluation).  
29. CDC Issues Federal Quarantine Order to Repatriated U.S. Citizens at March Air Reserve 
Base, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/t0131-2019-novel-coronavirus.html.   
30. Bill Chappell, 195 Americans Released from Coronavirus Quarantine at Southern
California Air Base, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Feb. 11, 2020, 3:13 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
health-shots/2020/02/11/804915231/195-americans-are-released-from-coronavirus-quarantine-at-
california-air-base. 
31. CDC Confirms Person-to-Person Spread of the New Coronavirus in the United States,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/
media/releases/2020/p0130-coronavirus-spread.html. 
32. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS OF THE IMMEDIATE
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL’S INVESTIGATION REGARDING CDC’S PRODUCTION OF COVID-
19 TEST KITS (June 19, 2020), https://context-cdn.washingtonpost.com/notes/prod/default/
documents/5610e9fa-86d7-4bd3-8b7a-f8df10c6fc9e/note/7331ef79-a672-4d2d-9eff-
f8ce39c2e462.#page=1; David Willman, CDC Coronavirus Test Kits Were Likely Contaminated, 
Federal Review Confirms, WASH. POST, June 20, 2020.   
33. Willman, supra note 32.
34. Id.
35. See CDC Confirms Possible Instance of Community Spread of COVID-19 in U.S.,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Feb. 26, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/s0226-Covid-19-spread.html; CDC Announces Additional 
COVID-19 Presumptive Positive Cases, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Feb. 28, 
2020), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/s0228-additional-COVID-19-cases.html. 
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who were symptomatic inadequate to achieve containment. 36 Several 
countries ramped up widespread testing and contact tracing to contain or 
suppress the spread of asymptomatic infection. But in the US, these efforts 
were slow to start and were quickly outpaced by widespread community 
transmission. This was exacerbated by the fact that the FDA initially 
restricted testing to labs that had obtained special approval. 37 Early CDC 
guidelines directed health care providers to refer patients for testing only 
if they had a history of travel to China, exposure to a person known to 
have been infected, or were hospitalized for pneumonia or acute 
respiratory distress. 38 Testing supplies were in short supply. 39 Lack of 
access to testing left people unsure about whether they posed a risk of 
transmitting the virus to others, and left state and local leaders ill equipped 
to deploy targeted disease control strategies. The CDC guidelines  
coincided with contradictory statements from the President questioning 
the advisability of widespread testing. 40 
36. Matt Apuzzo, Selam Gebrekidan, & David D. Kirkpatrick, How the World Missed COVID-
19’s Silent Spread, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2020. 
37. Lab Advisory: Reminder: COVID-19 Diagnostic Testing, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL 
AND PREVENTION (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/csels/dls/locs/2020/reminder_covid-
19_diagnostic_testing.html (“ Any laboratory that is not designated by CDC as a qualified laboratory 
and is implementing a COVID-19 diagnostic test other than the CDC EUA assay must contact the 
FDA to obtain an EUA before any COVID-19 diagnostic testing may be performed in their 
facilities.”). 
38. Update and Interim Guidance on Outbreak of 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV),
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION: CDC HEALTH ALERT NETWORK–00427 (Feb. 1, 
2020), https://emergency.cdc.gov/han/HAN00427.asp (“ Clinicians should ask: Does the person have 
fever or symptoms of lower respiratory infection, such as cough or shortness of breath? AND Has the 
patient traveled to mainland China within 14 days of symptom onset? OR Has the patient had close 
contact1 with a person confirmed with 2019-nCoV infection?”); Update and Interim Guidance on 
Outbreak of 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION: CDC HEALTH ALERT NETWORK–00428 (Feb. 28, 2020), 
https://emergency.cdc.gov/han/2020/HAN00428.asp (expanding eligibility for testing to those with 
“ [n]o identified source of exposure” only in the presence of “ [f]ever with severe acute lower 
respiratory illness (e.g., pneumonia, ARDS (acute respiratory distress syndrome) requiring 
hospitalization and without an alternative explanatory diagnosis (e.g., influenza).”); Update and 
Interim Guidance on Outbreak of 2019 Novel Coronavirus (2019-nCoV), CENTERS FOR DISEASE  
CONTROL AND PREVENTION: CDC HEALTH ALERT NETWORK–00429 (Mar. 8, 2020), 
https://emergency.cdc.gov/han/2020/HAN00429.asp (Abandoning restrictive guidelines by 
indicating that “ [c]linicians should use their judgment to determine if a patient has signs and 
symptoms compatible with COVID-19 and whether the patient should be tested.”). 
39. Michael D. Shear et al., The Lost Month: How a Failure to Test Blinded the U.S. to COVID-
19, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/28/us/testing-coronavirus-
pandemic.html. 
40. Matt Wilstein, Reporters Hammer Trump on Coronavirus Testing: Are you Being Selfish,
Daily Beast (Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.thedailybeast.com/reporters-hammer-trump-on-
coronavirus-testing-are-you-being-selfish. 
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On March 12, the CDC put up a document with the title: 
“Implementation of Mitigation Strategies for Communities with Local 
COVID-19 Transmission.”41 Described as “a framework for actions 
which local and state health departments can recommend in their  
community to both prepare for and mitigate community transmission of 
COVID-19,” the document recommended that “actions should be guided 
by the local characteristics of disease transmission, demographics, and 
public health and healthcare system capacity.”42 The framework 
recommended that “[a]ll individuals should limit community movement 
and adapt to disruptions in routine activities (e.g., school and/or work 
closures) according to guidance from local officials” in places with 
“substantial” community transmission. 43 Substantial community 
transmission was defined as occurring when “healthcare staffing [is] 
significantly impacted [and there are] multiple cases within communal 
settings like healthcare facilities, schools, mass gatherings etc.,”44 The 
CDC framework additionally recommended that in periods of substantial 
community transmission, organizations should “cancel community and 
faith-based gatherings of any size.”45 
The White House issued competing guidance on March 16, 2020. 
The “15 Days to Stop the Spread” guidelines recommended that certain 
groups—people who feel ill, people who test positive for coronavirus and 
their family members, and people who are older or who have serious 
underlying health conditions that put them at increased risk—should stay 
at home. It also recommended that everyone should “avoid social 
gatherings in groups of more than 10 people,” “eating or drinking at bars, 
restaurants, and food courts,” and “discretionary travel, shopping trips, 
and social visits.”46 With respect to closures, the guidelines noted that 
“[g]overnors in states with evidence of community transmission should 
close schools in affected and surrounding areas” and “[i]n states with 
evidence of community transmission, bars, restaurants, food courts, gyms, 
41. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION: IMPLEMENTATION OF MITIGATION 
STRATEGIES FOR COMMUNITIES (Mar. 12, 2020) (on file with author). 
42. Id. at 1.
43. Id. at 7.
44. Id. at 9.
45. Id.
46. 15 Days to Slow the Spread, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/15-days-slow-spread. 15 Days to Slow the Spread was later 
revised and replaced with 30 Days to Slow the Spread, The President’s Coronavirus Guidelines for 
America, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Mar. 30, 2020). 
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and other indoor and outdoor venues where groups of people congregate 
should be closed.”47 
In the latter half of March, state and local governments rapidly issued 
orders that exceeded the recommendations of the most well-vetted pre-
pandemic plans and federal guidelines for COVID-19. The same day the 
White House issued its 15 Days Guidance, seven local health officers in 
the San Francisco Bay Area followed the examples set by China and 
Italy and issued mandatory shelter-in-place orders and prohibitions on all 
nonessential onsite business operations. 48 The Bay Area orders opened the 
flood gates. Within two weeks, the majority of state governors had 
followed their lead. 49 
CDC’s guidance did not go as far. For large community events and 
mass gatherings CDC recommended cancellation of “gatherings of more 
than 10 people for organizations that serve higher-risk populations.”50 
Notably, even as nearly every state issued mandatory orders restricting the 
operation of commercial businesses, CDC’s only guidance for “keeping 
commercial establishments safe” recommended disinfection of surfaces, 
steps to stagger customer flow and frequent hand washing, 51 and its 
website suggested that businesses “[c]onsider establishing policies and 
practices for social distancing . . . if recommended by state and local 
health authorities.”52  CDC also issued a series of guidance documents for 
specific localities and states, including the cities of Santa Clara, Seattle, 
and New Rochelle, and the states of Florida and Massachusetts. The CDC 
47. I5 Days to Slow, supra note 46, at 2.
48. See, e.g., CITY AND COUNTY OF S.F. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, ORDER OF THE HEALTH
OFFICER NO. C19–07 (Mar. 16, 2020), https://sfgsa.org/sites/default/files/Document/OrderC 19-
07ShelterinPlace.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY48-MFZW]; Julia Prodis Sulek, Meet the Doctor Who 
Ordered the Bay Area’s Coronavirus Lockdown, the First in the U.S., MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 29, 
2020), https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/03/29/she-shut-down-the-bay-area-to-slow-the-deadly -
coronavirus-none-of-us-really-believed-we-would-do-it [https://perma.cc/K4DH-QYG8] (describing 
the events that led seven local jurisdictions to simultaneously issue shelter-in-place orders). 
49. Jennifer Kates et al., Stay-at-home Orders to Fight COVID-19 in the United States: A
Scattershot Approach, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Apr. 5, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-
policy-watch/stay- at-home-orders-to-fight-covid19 [https://perma.cc/WXK4-BCPU]  
50. Considerations for Events and Gatherings, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND
PREVENTION: COMMUNITY, WORK & SCHOOL, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-
ncov/community/large-events/mass-gatherings-ready-for-covid-19.html (last updated July 7, 2020). 
51. What Every American and Community Can Do Now to Decrease the Spread of the
Coronavirus, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/
coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/workplace-school-and-home-guidance.pdf (last visited April 4, 
2020). 
52. Interim Guidance for Businesses and Employers to Plan and Respond to Coronavirus
Disease 2019 (COVID-19), CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION: COMMUNITY, 
WORK & SCHOOL https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/guidance-business -
response.html (last updated May 6, 2020). 
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guidance for Santa Clara recommended “laser focused” and less 
restrictive interventions that were inconsistent with the county-wide 
shelter-in-place order the Santa Clara Health Officer had issued a day 
earlier. 53 CDC guidance for other locations similarly recommended less 
stringent measures than state and local authorities had already adopted. 
By the end of March, when the White House replaced its 15 Days 
guidance with “30 Days to Slow the Spread,” the majority of states had 
gone significantly further than the White House or CDC guidance 
recommended. 
In April, CDC reversed its earlier guidance directing that masks 
should only be worn by health workers and people who are sick, and this 
change was described as an about face in the media. 54  Several state and 
local governments also issued mandatory face mask requirements, 
physical distancing requirements, and capacity or density limits to reduce 
the risk of transmission for essential workers and customers at essential 
businesses. 55 Like social distancing, mask mandates for the general public 
were based on the need to treat everyone as if they could be silently 
spreading the virus to others. The early guidance against masks for the 
general public would be widely reported as having been motivated by the 
need to conserve scarce supplies for health workers. But the mask 
guidance flip-flop was also driven by evolving understanding of the risk 
of asymptomatic or pre-symptomatic spread.56 
On April 16, the White House released its Guidelines for Opening 
Up America Again. The White House plan recommended, but did not 
require, a phased approach to resuming social gatherings and reopening 
schools and the types of businesses that the previous White House 
guidelines had recommended, but not required, should be closed 
53. CDC’s Recommendations for 30 Day Mitigation Strategies for Santa Clara County,
California, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/Santa-Clara_Community_Mitigation.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2020). 
54. Matthew Keegan, Do Masks Work to Fight Coronavirus? East Asia Says: “Yes,” U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 7, 2020; Considerations for Wearing Masks, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL AND PREVENTION: YOUR HEALTH, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-
getting-sick/cloth-face-cover-guidance.html (last updated Aug. 7, 2020) (later guidance).  
55. Sophia Ankel & Connor Perret, More than 20 US States are now Requiring Residents to
Wear Face Masks when in Public, BUSINESS INSIDER, July 11, 2020, available at  
https://www.businessinsider.com/coronavirus-the-17-states-requiring-people-to-wear-masks-public-
2020-6; NASHP, Chart: Each State’s Covid-19 Reopening and Reclosing Plans and Mask 
Requirements, (Oct. 2, 2020), available at https://www.nashp.org/governors-prioritize-health-for-all. 
56. Nina Bai, Still Confused About Masks? Here’s the Science Behind How Face Masks
Prevent Coronavirus, U. CAL. S.F.: NEWS & MEDIA (June 26, 2020), 
https://www.ucsf.edu/news/2020/06/417906/still-confused-about-masks-heres-science-behind-how-
face-masks-prevent. 
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(including bars, restaurants, gyms, and other venues where groups of 
people gather). 57 Although the guidelines were reasonably cautious, they 
were met with widespread skepticism, particularly among Democratic 
governors, who announced they would develop their own plans for 
reopening. Ultimately, most states reopened gyms, bars, restaurants, and 
other higher-risk settings like movie theaters and bowling alleys in spite 
of the White House criteria in the guidance not being met. Some 
jurisdictions imposed requirements for the general public to wear face 
masks. 
Also in April, in preparation for overseeing the vaccine development, 
the Advisory Committee for Immunization Practices (ACIP) created a 
workgroup to oversee the development of COVID-19 vaccines, and that 
work group reported to the full committee during its June 2020 meeting.58 
ACIP traditionally monitors vaccines in development once they reach an 
advanced stage: for routine vaccines, it usually creates a workgroup 
before licensure. 59 
In June, cases surged in many places that had been largely spared 
during the spring. 60 State and local governments began what may 
ultimately prove to be the first of multiple phases of re-tightening. CDC 
continued to issue guidelines for various community settings, including 
businesses and schools. However, these guidelines were increasingly 
viewed as politicized, and media reports indicated that CDC statements 
were affected by non-CDC personnel. 61 For example, was evidence a 
57. Press Release, President Donald J. Trump Announces Guidelines for Opening Up America 
Again, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/president-donald-j-trump-announces-guidelines-opening-ameri ca; Guidelines: Opening 
Up American Again, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
openingamerica. 
58. Grace M. Lee, Beth P. Bell & Jose R. Romero, The Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices and Its Role in the Pandemic Vaccine Response, JAMA, July 22, 2020, 
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2768852. 
59. Jane Clare Smith, The Structure, Role, and Procedures of the U.S. Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices (ACIP), 28 VACCINE A68, A72, A74-5 (2010). 
60. Noah Higgins-Dunn, U.S. Coronavirus Cases Surge By More than 45,000 in One Day,
Total Surpasses 2.5 Million, CNBC: HEALTH AND SCIENCE (June 27, 2020).  
61. Tal Axelrod, CDC Director Says Guidance Shelved by White House Was “in Draft Form,”
THE HILL (May 9, 2020), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/496937-cdc-director-says-
guidance-shelved-by-white-house-was-in-draft-form; READ: The Full Draft CDC Guidelines on 
Reopening From Stay-at-Home Orders, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/13/politics/cdc-draft-
reopening-guidelines/index.html (last updated May 14, 2020); Samantha Putterman, Joe Biden 
Correct that Trump Administration Delayed, Scaled Back CDC Reopening Guidelines, POLITIFACT 
(July 6, 2020), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2020/jul/06/joe-biden/joe-biden-correct -
trump-administration-delayed-sca/; Lena H. Sun & Josh Dawsey, The CDC Is Walking a Tightrope 
as the Coronavirus Pandemic Meets Politics, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 10, 2020; Jill Colvin & Mike 
Stobbe, Trump, Pence Remarks at Odds with Medical Consensus, COLUMBIAN (July 10, 2020), 
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detailed CDC report on reopening business was “shelved” by the Trump 
administration. 62 The agency has, apparently, been ordered to “rewrite 
guidance to reopen schools to ‘make it easier and cost less’.”63 These events 
prompted four former CDC directors—Tom Frieden, Jeffrey Koplan,  
David Satcher, and Richard Besser—to pen an op-ed. They asserted that 
“over a period of more than 15 years, spanning Republican and 
Democratic administrations alike,” they could not recall a single time 
“when political pressure led to a change in the interpretation of scientific 
evidence.”64 
Revelations in August and September increased concerns about 
political intervention in CDC. In August 2020, the CDC revised its testing 
guidance to say that people without COVID-19 symptoms do not 
“necessarily need a test. 65“ In response, the Infectious Diseases Society of 
America published a statement calling for immediate reversal of the 
changes and criticizing it. 66 
In late August 25, 2020, Amy Maxmen, a science writer with the 
prestigious peer reviewed journal Nature, wrote an article on data 
challenges in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States.67 
The article said: 
Some speculate that because the pandemic is politically charged, data 
describing the situation are guarded closely by officials in the admin-
istration of President Donald Trump. Researchers say that investigation 
published in the CDC’s journal Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Re-
ports have been thorough, but are published online long after they can 
influence outcomes. . . .  Samuel Groseclose, a public-health specialist 
who retired from CDC in 2018, suggests that the reports are undergoing 
an unusual amount of review within the agency, and perhaps its parent 
agency, the US Department for Health and Human Services (HHS).68 
https://www.columbian.com/news/2020/jul/10/trump-pence-remarks-at-odds-with-medical-
consensus. 
62. Putterman, supra note 61.
63. Sun & Dawsey, supra note 61.
64. Frieden, et al., supra note 4.
65. Will Feuer, CDC Quietly Revises Coronavirus Guidance to Downplay Importance of
Testing Asymptomatic People. CNBC (August 26, 2020) available at: https://www.cnbc.com/
2020/08/26/cdc-quietly-revises-coronavirus-guidance-to-downplay-importance-of-testing-for-
asymptomatic-people.html.  
66. IDSA/HIVMA Statement on Changes to CDC Guidance, available at
https://www.idsociety.org/news—publications-new/articles/2020/idsahivma-statement-on-changes-
to-cdc-guidance/.  
67. Maxmen, supra note 5.
68. Id.
120 CONLAWNOW [12:107 
More explicit coverage of political pressure on the Morbidity and 
Mortality Weekly Reports (MMWR)–which have traditionally been 
authored by career scientists and seen as a scientific source, and has 
traditionally not been subject to political interference – was published in 
the second week of September. Journalist Dan Diamond from Politico 
documented efforts both from the politically appointed CDC Director, Dr. 
Robert Redfield and from the Department of Health and Human Services’ 
spokesman, Michael Caputo, to influence the content of the reports.69 The 
article described direct efforts to intervene in the content of the report, 
some of which had an effect.70 
Political interference in CDC guidance and efforts was not the main 
cause of the pandemic or of the failure to contain it. However, while some 
of the problems in CDC’s response (like the testing contamination) were 
internal, political intervention harmed CDC by undermining trust in it.71 
The intervention also raises real concerns that the administration will try 
to undermine the traditionally independent process of making 
recommendations related to COVID-19 vaccines. 72 The concern that the 
administration will directly intervene in CDC’s professional decisions is  
not a hypothetical concern: there is strong evidence that influence by the 
administration had a role in the FDA’s choice to give an emergency use 
authorization (EUA) to hydroxychloroquine. 73 The revelation of political 
intervention with the MMWR in CDC – a scientific source – also shows 
that this is already done, and is a real concern. 74  There is every reason to 
worry that there will be efforts to influence the vaccine 
recommendations. 75 
69. Diamond, supra note 5.
70. Id.
71. Adam Cancryn, Hundreds of Health Groups Petition Against Trump, POLITICO: HEALTH
CARE (July 7, 2020),  https://www.politico.com/news/2020/07/07/hundreds-health-groups-petition-
trump-350154; CDC’s Politicization “Extremely Dangerous” for Americans, Says Its Former Head, 
PBS (July 14, 2020), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/cdcs-politicization-extremely-dangerous-
for-americans-says-its-former-head.  
72. Lee, Bell & Romero, supra note 55.
73. Sarah Owermohle, FDA Ends Emergency Use of Hydroxychloroquine for Coronavirus,
POLITICO: HEALTH CARE (June 15, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/15/fda-ends-
emergency-use-of-hydroxychloroquine-319872; Laurie McGinley & Josh Dawsey, Touting 
Criticized Study, White House Presses FDA to Authorize Hydroxychloroquine–Again, WASH. POST, 
July 10, 2020.   
74. Diamond, supra note 5.
75. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Paul A. Offit, Opinion, Could Trump Turn a Vaccine into a
Campaign Stunt?, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2020.  
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III. CDC’S CURRENT GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS ON CHANGING IT 
The Constitution addresses the appointment of federal officers in 
Article II, Section 2, referred to as “the Appointments Clause.”76 Under 
the Appointment Clause, “Officers of the United States” should be 
nominated by the President, “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,” 
but Congress has the authority to vest the appointment of inferior officers 
(which the clause does not define) “in the President alone, in the Courts 
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”77 In practice, large segments of 
the administrative state are not appointed under the Appointment Clause, 
but serve as civil servants appointed through a merit system. 78 
The line between those who must be appointed via the appointment 
clause and those who are not is blurry. The distinction is focused on the 
concept of “officers of the United States,” defined by the Supreme Court 
as those who “wield ‘significant authority.’”79 There is conflicting 
jurisprudence on who, exactly, is an officer under that definition. 80 At 
least one author suggests that large swaths of our civil service are 
unconstitutionally appointed under the Clause, because of her analysis of 
the original meaning of the term “officer.”81 However, the dominant view 
in the legal community, drawing on non-originalist meanings–accepts that 
a substantial portion of the public service do not have to be considered 
“officers” for the purpose of the Appointment Clause. 82 
76. Michael Devitt, Coronavirus Remains Front and Center at June ACIP Meeting, AM.
ACAD. FAM. PHYSICIANS: NEWS, July 1, 2020, https://www.aafp.org/news/health-of-the-
public/20200701acipjunemtg.html. 
77. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
78. Nina L. Mendelson, The Uncertain Effects of Senate Confirmation Delay in the Agencies,
64 DUKE L. J. 1571, 1582-86 (2015).  
79. Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443, 447 
(2018). 
80. Id. at 447-49.
81. Id. at 449-55.
82. Officers of the U.S. Within the Meaning of the Appointments Clause, 31 Op. O.L.C. 73,
76-89 (2007); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Actings, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 613, 659 (2020). A detailed 
discussion of the scope of the appointment clause is more than is needed for this article, given its 
relatively simple proposal, but besides the sources above, extensive discussions of the Appointment 
Clause, in the wake of Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018), can be found at the following sources: 
Symposium on Lucia v. SEC, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (2018), 
https://www.yalejreg.com/topic/symposium-on-lucia-v-sec; Samuel A, Shwartz, Lucia v. SEC: The 
Ambiguity of the Appointments Clause Continues, Sending Tremors Throughout the Administrative 
State, 14 J. BUS. & TECH. L. PROXY 1 (2019); Michael A. Sabino, “Liberty Requires Accountability”: 
The Appointments Clause, Lucia v. SEC, and the Next Constitutional Controversy, 11 WM. & MARY 
BUS. L. REV. 173 (2019-2020). 
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The other piece of the appointment puzzle is whether and when 
Congress can limit the President’s ability to remove officers. 
Traditionally, the person who appointed an officer can remove her or him; 
in the case of principal officers, appointed by the President with the advice 
and consent of the Senate, that means the President. 83 There is an 
extensive jurisprudence on removal, but the most recent decision on the 
matter, the Supreme Court’s decision in Seila Law v. CFPB, appears to 
have both simplified and restricted Congress’ ability to limit removal.84 
In Seila Law, the Court made a strong statement in support of unlimited 
Presidential removal power, but acknowledged two historical exceptions 
are still valid – “one for multimember expert agencies that do not wield 
substantial executive power, and one for inferior officers with limited 
duties and no policymaking or administrative authority.”85 Seila Law 
certainly deserves in-depth, thoughtful treatment of its own, and raises 
questions for positions that do not fit the exceptions but have limits on 
removal. But since this paper proposes removal limits for multi-member 
boards with powers that are primarily non-executive removal, Seila Law’s 
main holding, which is about single-head agencies and expressly allows 
an exception for multi-member boards, is not a barrier. 86 
At present, the CDC Director is appointed by the President without 
a requirement for the advice and consent of the Senate, and can be 
removed at will. 87 Administrative structures of appointment vary 
dramatically from position to position, but this specific arrangement offers 
almost no protection from the political executive. Further, other factors – 
like the agency’s physical distance from other power centers in 
Washington DC and a culture of not playing politics – make the agency 
especially vulnerable in the face of an administration determined to 
83. Saikrishna Prakash, Removal and Tenure in Office, 92 VIRGINIA L. REV. 1779, 1783-84 
(2006). 
84. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, No. 19-7, slip op. (U.S. June 29,
2020). 
85. Id. at 16.
86. The decision is very recent. For an article already addressing it, see Jed Handelsman
Shugerman, The Decisions of 1789 Were Non-Unitary: Removal by Judiciary and the Imaginary 
Unitary Executive (Part II), FORDHAM L. SCH. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES (May 10, 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3597496.   
87. See, e.g., David Rosner & Linda P. Fried, Traditions, Transitions and Transfats: New
Directions for Public Health, 125 PUB. HEALTH REP. 3, 3-4 (2010); see also COMM. ON HOMELAND 
SECURITY & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE, POLICY AND SUPPORTING 
POSITIONS, at 68 (Comm. Print 2016), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-PLUMBOOK-
2016/pdf/GPO-PLUMBOOK-2016.pdf (CDC director is a non-career appointment, and no term 
limits exist).  
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interfere in its work. 88 The fact that the agency does not have a specific 
authorizing statute setting out its roles also means that the executive has 
more discretion to redefine or take over its role. 
The solution is not for CDC to become more political. Given the 
CDC’s special role–serving as a centralized platform for disease and 
injury surveillance and providing advice and guidance for how other 
agencies and actors respond to health threats –there are real benefits to its 
detachment from direct political struggles. An agency whose primary role 
is advising, providing guidance, and training should be more isolated from 
politics than agencies whose role is primarily regulatory. The best solution 
is restructuring the CDC to provide layers of protection between the 
agency and the administration, while maintaining some direct political 
accountability. 
IV. THE FEDERAL RESERVE AS A MODEL
Completely detaching CDC leadership structure from politics is both 
undesirable (since public health is inherently political) and likely not 
constitutionally permissible. It is also not necessary. A model that 
provides some protection from political influence while maintaining a 
political role in guiding the agency offers a good balance, and a statute 
clearly codifying the CDC’s role would protect its ability to provide 
expert guidance, give that guidance more prominence, and bring into 
sharp relief any effort by White House tries to bypass CDC by issuing its 
own guidance. Institutionalizing independence also signals to people 
inside the CDC and outside that independent guidance is, in fact, what is 
legally expected. 
Congress should enact a statute doing two things. First, it should 
clearly define the CDC’s role. The definition should state that the CDC is 
charged with providing expertise, guidance, and support (through 
training, research, directly assigning personnel and other ways) in 
preventing communicable and non-communicable diseases and injuries in 
the United States and abroad. The CDC is authorized to create and analyze 
expert knowledge, provide guidance, and provide assistant and support to 
local, state, federal and global actors dealing with diseases and enact rules 
and create guidance documents to fill these roles. The CDC already has 
authority to enact rules related to directly delegated regulatory duties, but 
such a statute could and should include an express delegation of 
88. Nicholas Florko, The CDC Has Always Been an Apolitical Island. That’s Left it
Defenseless Against Trump, STAT (July 13, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/07/13/cdc-
apolitical-island-defenseless. 
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regulatory authority within the CDC’s sphere of responsibility. Second, 
Congress should restructure the CDC’s leadership along the lines of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed). This model 
has several benefits. First, it has a long history of acceptance, and is on 
solid ground constitutionally. Second, it provides real guarantees of 
independence while preserving a role for the President and the Senate in 
structuring the leadership. 
One problem with moving to a Board is that the CDC’s role in 
outbreaks means that it has to deal with emergencies practically every 
year. A board–where decision making may be slower than a single 
individual–may find such response more challenging. However, a 
potential alternative of making the Director only removable for cause 
appears foreclosed by Selia Law, while a multi-member board can 
constitutionally have removal protections. A potential solution is to 
provide for limited emergency decision making authority by the Chairman 
of the Board, potentially with the advice of the vice-chairs. While the 
President can appoint the Chair and remove the Chair from that position, 
the President cannot completely remove the person, and limits on 
authority—for example, a time limit—can prevent abuse. 
In 1935, for a variety of reasons, Congress passed the Banking Act, 
which, among other things, changed the method of appointment and 
removal of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.89 The 
Fed is the central banking system of the United States, whose role is “to 
provide financial services to depository institutions and the U.S. 
government, supervise and regulate certain types of financial institutions, 
set monetary policy, and maintain the stability of the financial system.”90 
One change was distancing the Fed from politics by “removing the 
Treasury Secretary and the comptroller of the currency from the directors’ 
table” and lengthening the terms the governors serve to fourteen years.91 
The focus of this article is not on whether this structure helped the 
Fed achieve its purposes or whether this is good public policy in the 
context of the Federal Reserve System. 92 The structure of the federal 
89. PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE 29-30 
(2017); ROGER LOWENSTEIN, AMERICA’S BANK 266 (2015). 
90. What is the Fed?, FED. RES. BANK S.F.: EDUC., https://www.frbsf.org/education/teacher-
resources/what-is-the-fed (last visited August 17, 2020). 
91. LOWENSTEIN, supra note 89, at 266.
92. See, e.g., Michael Wade Strong, Rethinking the Federal Reserve System: A Monetarist Plan 
for a More Constitutional System of Central Banking, 34 IND. L. REV. 371, 381-90 (2000-2001); 
David Min, Federalizing Bank Governance, 51 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 833 (2019-2020); CONTI-BROWN, 
supra note 89, at 105-373; Andrew Atkins, The AIG Bailout: Constraining the Fed’s Discretion, 14 
N.C. BANKING INST. 335, 350-60 (2010).  
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reserve board is, to my knowledge, the most rigorous set of institutional 
protections of independence that can survive constitutional muster and the 
CDC would benefit from a similar structure. 
The board consists of seven members appointed by the President 
with the advice and consent of the Senate for fourteen years in staggered 
terms. 93 Members are only removable by the President for cause.94 The 
Banking Act sets out some criteria for appointment, stating that, of the 
Governors, 
[N]ot more than one [. . .] shall be selected from any one Federal Re-
serve district, the President shall have due regard to a fair representation 
of the financial, agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests, and 
geographical divisions of the country. . . . the President shall appoint at 
least 1 member with demonstrated primary experience working in or su-
pervising community banks having less than $10,000,000,000 in total 
assets.95  
Aside from that, appointments are at the political branches’ discretion, but 
the long terms and removal protection provide for at least some 
independence during service. The President appoints, with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, the Chair of the Board and two Vice Chairs for four 
years–but only out of the longer-termed board members. Members cannot 
be reappointed after serving a full term (but can be appointed for fourteen 
years if they came in to complete a term). 96 
The structure of the Board of Governors is clearly constitutional. A 
recent book called into question the constitutionality of the structure of 
the Federal Open Market Committee (the Fed’s monetary policy 
committee) because of the presence of the membership of Presidents of 
several Federal Reserve Banks on it—but contrasted it with the (clear) 
constitutionality of the appointment of Board Members. 97 In several cases, 
the D.C. Circuit refused to entertain challenges to FOMC’s structure, 
seeing it as a question internal to the legislature. 98 But we found no one 
arguing that the structure of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve is unconstitutional, nor any valid legal challenges. In reality, the 
structure is well within constitutional principles. The Board members are 
appointed as principal officers under the appointment clause, and removal 
93. 12 U.S.C. § 241.
94. 12 U.S.C. § 242.
95. 12 U.S.C. § 241.
96. 12 U.S.C. § 242.
97. CONTI-BROWN, supra note 89, at 112-15.
98. See Melcher v. Federal Open Market Committee, 644 F. Supp. 510, 563-65 (D.C. Cir.
1986) (summarizing that history). 
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limits are not unusual in multi-member agencies. 99 For that matter, multi-
member boards with staggered terms are not unusual. 100 This structure led 
to some, though not unlimited, independence of the Fed from both 
Congress and the political executive. 101 
Congress should structure CDC’s governance to have a seven-
member board with similar long–12 or 14–years staggered terms, with a 
member replaced every two years, with board members only subject to 
removal for cause (While the meaning of for-cause removal has never 
been well-defined, and there is a risk of political firing under this rubric 
as well, historical experience suggests it is, in fact, a meaningful 
protection102). Guidance for appointment should suggest drawing on 
expertise in the different areas of prevention the CDC covers–prevention 
of infectious diseases, non-infectious diseases, injuries and global health, 
at a macro level. A number of positions on board can be statutorily 
reserved for previous or sitting agency members. Modeled on the Banking 
Act, the statute can state that “the President shall appoint at least 1 
member with demonstrated experience in running one of the CDC centers 
or units.” 
A staggered, multi-members board with terms longer than the sitting 
President would limit presidential control. Allowing the President to 
appoint the Chairman of the board from among the governors will give a 
sitting President direct, though limited, influence on the leadership of the 
Board–and a two-years staggering will ensure that each President should 
have a chance to appoint one or two directors. 
These changes will increase CDC’s independence from politics, and 
also send a symbolic message, a message that Congress expects our public 
health guidance to be apolitical and science-based. It would not solve all 
or even most of the problems facing us in pandemics, but it will assure the 
existence of a body of experts with a defined role, a role that includes 
speaking up. It would not prevent the White House from issuing its own 
guidance–but it will be clear to observers that such guidance implies  
political rejection of expertise (which may in itself be a deterrence), and 
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it will reduce the direct pressure the White House can impose on the 
agency. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There are many changes we need to make to improve our pandemic 
preparedness going forward. But a positive step can be providing the CDC 
better defined institutional independence, as it acts as an important expert 
agency that guides and supports efforts at preventing disease. Political 
efforts to interfere in CDC’s independence directly hurt its legitimacy. 
Without real, visible change, it will be hard for it to regain the public’s 
trust. Both for real independence–and for protecting the CDC’s image–we 
need to act. 
